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that there is reason to allow a party to reap the fruits of its subsequent
investigation. 28 This, of course, is subject to the proviso in CPLR
3101(d) that the identification is immune from disclosure unless it cannot be duplicated and withholding it will result in undue hardship.
Hartley recognizes and perpetuates this dichotomy.
To reduce costly court battles and lengthy delays it would appear
that even this last vestige should also disappear. The advantages to be
gained by the policy of liberal disclosure far outweigh any contingent
detriment that might be experienced by allowing one party to profit
from the results of a subsequent investigation by his adversary. If the
end to be sought by the judicial process is justice in the abstract, then
complete disclosure is a means to that end. A self-serving refusal to
disclose the identity of hostile witnesses does not serve justice.
CPLR 3101(d): Conflict between departments over burden of proof
relating to material prepared for litigation.
In Dikun v. New York Central Railroad,29 a wrongful death action, plaintiff's motion to examine defendant's employee, a crew member of a train involved in an accident which gave rise to the cause of
action, was granted. Defendant sought to prevent the examination of
its employee by invoking CPLR 3101(d)(2) which provides that "any
writing or anything created by or for a party or his agent in preparation
of litigation" shall not be obtainable by the other party. 0 In the application of this section the courts are in general accord that "employee
statements made in the regular course of business stating what they
observed and did are not material prepared for litigation protected
81
from discovery by CPLR 3101(d)."
The party seeking to avoid disclosure has the burden of proving
that the material was prepared solely for litigation and not in the regular course of business- and that burden is not met by merely routing all material through an attorney. Divergent conclusions have been
drawn by the several departments as to how this burden may be met.
28 See, e.g., Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 413, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (1st Dep't
1964): "While the policy of the CPLR is to broaden disclosure procedures, discovery should
not be permitted to substitute for independent investigation of facts which are equally

available to both parties." (Emphasis added.)
29 58 Misc. 2d 439, 295 N.YS.2d 830 (sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1968).
80 This prohibition against disclosure may only be invoked in the absence of the
court's finding that, because of a change in conditions, the material can no longer be
duplicated and to withhold it will result in injustice or undue hardship. CPLR 3101(d).
8158 Misc. 2d at 440, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 832, and cases cited therein. See also 3 WmNSTEM,
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3101.50 (1968).

1969]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

In O'Neill v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Authority, 2 an accident report filled out by the defendant's employeebus driver, and mailed directly to defendant's attorney without ever
having been seen by any supervisory personnel of defendant, was held
by the first department to be a writing created in preparation for litigation, and hence not subject to disclosure under CPLR 3101(d)(2).
The fourth department, in Brunswick Corp. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,3 3 cited the O'Neill lower court decision with approval.
However, since O'Neill was later reversed, the fourth department is
seemingly in conflict with the first department. Brunswick held that
examinations with respect to observations made by defendant's agents,
before they consulted defendant's attorneys, should be disclosed, and
the attorneys by retroactive adoption of such observations and reports
cannot convert them into their own work product. Dikun cites Brunswick as being the law in the fourth department.
The net result is that in both departments the party resisting
disclosure has the burden of proving that the material is immune. But
in the first department, under O'Neill, an accident report drafted by
defendant's attorney, to be completed by defendant's employee and returned directly to the attorney, meets this burden; whereas, in the
fourth department, it would not.84
The rule in the first department would seem to be in derogation
of the ideal of complete disclosure espoused by the CPLR. Any observations made by defendant's employee at the scene of the accident
should properly be obtainable by the plaintiff at a pre-trial examination. Such observations as are customarily included in an accident
report are not truly created for litigation, but are advantageous testimony obtained and protected by one party solely because of its relation to the witness.
3227 App. Div. 2d 185, 277 N.Y.S2d 771 (1st Dep't 1967), rev'g 47 Misc. 2d 765, 263
N.Y.S.2d 187 (Civil Ct. Bronx County 1965). See also The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice,42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 283, 299 (1967).
83 27 App. Div. 2d 182, 183, 278 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (4th Dep't 1967).
34 For a comprehensive study of this dichotomy see 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3101, supp.
commentary 15-16 (1967).
In Weisgold v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 456, 273 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Special T.
Albany County 1966) the court held that a report made for defendant by one of its

employees, and routed directly to the defendant's attorney, did not establish it as an item
prepared for litigation. The court stressed that the defendant had to prove that the report
was prepared specifically and solely in contemplation of litigation and not in the regular
course of business. This case is the latest and most definitive statement from the third
department on where it stands on disclosure of accident reports. Weisgold can, of course,
be distinguished from O'Neill, in that in O'Neill it is more obvious that the report was
prepared solely and specifically in contemplation of litigation.

